In late August 2023, Hurricane Idalia ravaged Southeast Georgia, downing not only trees and powerlines but also numerous farms, severely impairing Georgia’s agriculture. The impacts can still be seen today.

Georgia is the nation’s most robust producer of pecans and has been leading the nation consistently each year with the highest utilized production of pecans in recent times. Clearly, pecans are a large part of Georgia’s economic agricultural system. Each year, the pecan industry comprises around two billion dollars of Georgia’s economy and generates approximately 13,000 jobs, making it a substantial portion of the state’s economy.

However, pecans do not grow instantaneously. Pecan trees require 4 to 10 years to mature, with some not producing nuts until they are around a decade old. Hurricanes pose a huge economic threat to the almost 3,000 pecan farmers located in Georgia, as even downed limbs can deeply hinder a tree’s productive capacity for years. In these orchards, farmers plant trees via the process of grafting. During the process of grafting, farmers take established roots that thrive in Georgia’s rich soil and attach them to the tree shoots so that as they grow, they combine and transform into a more productive, resistant plant. These trees are then planted 40 to 70 feet from one another, which means they require a considerable amount of space to grow and produce pecans.

Hurricanes Idalia and Helene have caused severe damage to Georgia’s economy because of pecan tree destruction. Hurricane Idalia made landfall as a Category 3 Hurricane, eventually becoming a Category 2 hurricane as it crossed the Florida-Georgia Line. Idalia sustained winds of 50 to 70 miles per hour. These speeds are substantial enough to topple trees, wrench immature pecans from their branches, and cause tree limbs to fall. Elevated wind speeds are especially troubling for pecan trees, which can only withstand 60 mile an hour winds before causing major structural damage and an increased risk of uprooted trees. Orchards in Idalia’s path in Southeast Georgia experienced around 50 percent loss of trees and substantial losses for that year’s pecan crops.

Hurricane Helene posed a similar threat for pecan farmers. In late September of 2025, Hurricane Helene swept across Georgia, not only killing hundreds of people, but also severely damaging Georgia’s agriculture, most notably the pecan industry. Helene emerged from the Atlantic Ocean as a Category 4 hurricane, eventually losing steam and crossing the Florida-Georgia line as a Category 2 hurricane. With wind speeds reaching up to 137 miles per hour, Helene downed pecan trees in its path, causing an estimated $5.5 billion in agricultural damages, with economic losses totaling around $100 billion. In comparison, Hurricane Helene was stronger than Hurricane Idalia, causing an estimated 40 percent loss of trees from eight to 29 years old and an estimated 70 percent loss of older trees that were already proven to be reliable producers.

The resulting damages from these hurricanes have caused major economic distress for Georgia as the orchards continue to recover. Hurricane Helene, in particular, caused losses of $138 million in the pecan industry alone. Due to the lengthy maturation period, the impacts of these natural disasters are far-reaching. Pecans, while a sizable agricultural resource for the state of Georgia, are not an especially resilient crop. Large catastrophic events will take longer for the pecan industry to recover as the trees not only need to be replanted but also tended to and harvested. Meanwhile, the pecan harvesters have little-to-no revenue source until pecan production increases again.

In addition to plant damages, tariffs on U.S. exports to China have troubled pecan growers, as they face greater competition from others internationally who offer lower prices. 

China has imposed additional tariffs in direct response to the blanket tariffs the U.S. recently imposed on Chinese imports. Under the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, the U.S. has currently suspended its tariffs covering pecans, but farmers are unsure about the impacts of future tariffs. Because Georgia has exported around 50-70% of its pecans to China for the last decade, the U.S. and China trade war will greatly harm farmers as the cost of pecans in China increases. The quantity exported to China will subsequently decrease and stifle Georgia’s economy. In addition, the cost of pecan production continuously increases as farmers combat scab, a disease affecting plants that can lead to deformed fruit and leaf drop. Scab requires numerous fungicide sprays due to increased resistance. Combating the disease raises the costs of production even higher—at times an upwards of 60 percent. These rising costs to pecan production, coupled with higher crop prices abroad due to tariffs, will reduce the profit margins of pecan farmers and make it even more challenging in the future to survive catastrophes such as hurricanes as they await a new crop of pecans.

Amidst higher costs, lower prices abroad, and lower margins, Georgian pecan farmers, from small family farms to large growers, are concerned with the future of their industry. Pecan farmers can still manage to plant, grow, and sell pecans due to government aid following natural disasters, but it is imperative that Georgian communities also take action to support such a vital industry. For one, farmers can consider seeking other sources of revenue as they recover, such as selling pecan wood. Some may even consider agritourism as a way of increasing community awareness while simultaneously boosting funds. In addition, supporting local growers through farmers markets and buying locally can help to increase pecan farmer’s profits, and one can even join community organizations whose goal is to inform the public of farmer’s needs. Lastly, when local and national elections arise, citizens should always remember to look into policies that advocate for the wellbeing of farmers. Farmers are the backbone of America, and their resilience continues to sustain society. Naturally, society needs to reciprocate this strength and pour back into the industry which allows it to thrive.

The United States remains a global superpower in economic and military power. However, it has been losing ground to China in the critical minerals sector for years. Critical minerals are rare earth elements (REEs) and substances essential for manufacturing technological equipment such as semiconductors, EV batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines. Sought-after critical minerals include lithium, nickel, cobalt, and copper. These mineral reserves are not in shortage, rather, mining and production abilities have not evolved at the pace of demand.

While Africa has historically stood as a key source of critical minerals, Latin America has gained leverage in the critical minerals market as importers seek to diversify critical mineral suppliers. The Lithium Triangle alone, which encompasses Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina, contains more than half of the world’s reserves of lithium, more than a third of its copper, and nearly one-fifth of nickel and rare-earth metals alongside smaller reserves of cobalt, titanium, zinc, and REEs.

Although Latin America’s reserves are abundant, its production capabilities are limited due to a lack of infrastructure and domestic investments in mining and supply chains. Protests over poor working conditions and environmental damages from mining expansions have taken place, which has built up opposition to foreign offshore investments. 

Both China and the United States have demonstrated interest in Latin America’s resources, with China surpassing the U.S. as the region’s top trade partner as of 2025. With both countries searching for more sources of critical minerals, can their ambitions coexist in Latin America, or could the competition worsen tariff wars? With China already having an established presence in the region, can the United States successfully “catch up” or is it too late?

China is the world’s largest importer and exporter of critical minerals and dominates global refining processes. It accounts for 70% of global extraction and over 85% of processing capacity. In its expansion to the Western Hemisphere, China has heavily invested in Latin America to acquire critical minerals for its military, EV, and renewable energy industries. For decades, it has established free trade agreements (FTAs) with various Latin American countries, primarily Venezuela and Chile. Since 2017, it has invested billions of dollars in long-term major mining projects in Argentina and Peru through companies such as Tianqi Lithium and Zijin Mining Group. Additionally, China has been actively buying shares in local Latin American mining firms, such as Chile’s Sociedad Química y Minera (SQM), and has whole mines in Brazil and Peru. Consequently, Latin America’s geopolitical position has been limited to exporting raw materials and selling companies and mines to Chinese companies.

With China’s reach expanding over the region’s top mines and companies, there are growing fears of Latin American mines and companies being bought out and plagued by poor working conditions, as is the case in Africa. These fears are already materializing, as the Chinese-owned Peruvian copper mine Las Bambas was temporarily shut down in 2022 due to local protests.

The United States is among the top five world critical mineral importers, according to the World Trade Organization in 2022. Despite having considerable domestic reserves of magnesium and zinc, the United States relies on foreign imports for over 80% of its critical mineral needs, with China being its main exporter. Despite being key trade partners, U.S.-China trade relations have been tense over the years. This has culminated in China’s recent tariffs and bans on critical mineral and rare earth elements to the United States, to which the U.S. responded with tariffs on Chinese imports. Expanding into Latin America could help the United States decrease U.S. reliance on China for critical minerals while solidifying its influence in the Americas region.

The United States’ efforts and investments in Latin American critical minerals have been insufficient. The 2023 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is the most significant effort, which established a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Chile with tax subsidies to Americans who buy EVs made with Chilean lithium. 

Instead of buying out mines and companies without regard for work conditions and local protests as China has done, the United States must take a relationship-focused rather than a colonial exploration-focused approach to Latin America. With its vast industrial capabilities, the U.S. could establish professional training, technology, and infrastructure exchange to build up struggling local supply chains, thus keeping profit and jobs locally. To complement its investment, the U.S. should negotiate Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) through the IRA similar to Chile’s with Brazil and Argentina, for example, focused on critical mineral security.

The United States cannot fully avoid or run away from China in Latin America. It must recover its regional leverage by fostering relationships rather than neo-colonial exploration to maintain critical mineral security before it is too late.

In the wake of a tumultuous election cycle, the nation is preparing for a Biden presidency. The transition of power is expected to be far from smooth, and while President Trump hangs on to the hope of a second term well past its likelihood, the Biden team has begun preparation for damage control as soon as they step into the White House. Over the course of four years, the country has seen a variety of controversial and polarizing decisions coming out of the Oval Office, from executive orders on law enforcement to going after DREAMers. The new shock factor of the presidency has been the highlight reel of news cycles for just over four years, and while the public was discussing the newest tweet or the most recent scandal, untold damage was being done behind the scenes by those who reached power on Trump’s coattails. This was made abundantly clear the moment the president started making decisions on environmental policy. 

The main goal of Trump’s environmental policy plan can be boiled down to one word: deregulation. Promising to be a pro-industry president, his administration worked tirelessly to roll back regulation and protections in order to eliminate “red tape” and governmental oversight. Trump started the anti-environment rhetoric during the campaign, promising to pull out of the Paris Climate Agreement and approve the Keystone Pipeline project. While these big-ticket items helped to establish the course of action for the administration, it was the deregulation of existing environmental protections and safeguards that will be the hardest to correct. 

In 2016 Trump appointed Scott Pruitt to be the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. This came as one of the most shocking Cabinet-level appointments due to Pruitt’s long history with the fossil fuel industry and had been spent most of his time as Oklahoma Attorney General suing the very agency he would later head. He then spent his two years as EPA administrator advocating for cuts in the department’s budget, blocking scientists from being on policy advisory boards, and putting an end to the Obama-era Clean Power Plan. This plan, which would start regulating carbon emissions in 2022 and require power companies to respond to clean energy incentives, was a significant step forward in national climate change legislation. Officials across multiple fields advocated for the Clean Power Plan with economists claiming the plan could save America $20 billion in climate-related costs as well as provide $34 million in health benefits. 

This, in combination with Trump announcing the U.S., would be pulling out of the Paris Climate Agreement in 2017, largely overshadowed all the holes Pruitt was putting in the boat of environmental regulation. In two years Pruitt stopped the ban on neurotoxin chlorpyrifos, lifted control on air pollution from industry, rolled back vehicle efficiency standards, lowered fines on pollution infractions, increased loopholes for diesel truck pollution, removed the words “climate change” and “global warming” from all EPA sites, removed scientists from EPA advisory boards and replaced them with industry officials from oil and coal, tried to eliminate non-replicable research efforts such as research on large oil spill events, and slowed down the timeline for regulation to move through the agency. 

Following an unrelated scandal of misuse of funds and improper spending and security practices, Pruitt resigned, hoping to avoid a prison sentence. What seemed like an opportunity to shuffle the EPA administration quickly became even worse than before. Here came Andrew Wheeler, a former coal lobbyist and close Trump ally, to continue the work of Pruitt. 

Andrew Wheeler gained recognition lobbying for Murray Energy, a company that has paid millions in fines for violating health and safety standards and for knowingly polluting a creek in Ohio with coal slurry. At the time that Murray Energy was Wheeler’s client, they created a plan for the EPA that called for cutting the department nearly in half and suggested overturning rules that limited mercury, carbon, and air pollution across state lines. It was this record that Wheeler brought the EPA, and he continued the work of his former boss, Pruitt. 

Over 4 years, the Trump administration and the EPA have rolled back or started the process of rolling back over 100 environmental regulations, protections, and policies. The shock factor of the administration distracted from the severe damage being done. Trump also slipped environmental deregulation into the long list of executive orders so while the media covered the “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements” order, Trump and Pruitt were rewording the “Waters of the U.S.” legislation to reduce the number of waterways that were protected. There is also much smaller legislation that is being slowly stripped away. The list includes, but is not limited to, 27 rollbacks on air pollution and emission standards, 19 rollbacks on drilling and extraction regulation, 11 rollbacks on water pollution levels, and 8 rollbacks on toxic substances and safety. 

Now as Jan. 20 approaches Biden will not only have to work to further America’s environmental plans, but will have to spend a significant amount of time reinstating policies and protections that were previously in place. There is the potential that things like the Green New Deal, or Biden’s equivalent the “Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice,” will have to be put on hold until the environmental infrastructure is restored. Biden has already stated that he would reinstate the U.S. in the Paris Climate Agreement. While this is a necessary step, it is not much more than a formality since the US only officially left on Nov. 4, 2020. The real change will come with the appointment of an EPA administrator with an emphasis on environmental protection and climate change legislation.